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COMMENTS
COMMENTAIRES

CONFLICT OF LAWS IN SPACE AND IN TIME-"CONFLIT MOBILE"CAPACITY TO MARRY-VALIDITY OF FOREIGN DIVORCE-RETROSPECTIVE LEGISLATION.-The unstable character of modern legislation and its diversity in space create a host of problems for lawyers dealing with cases involving a foreign element. A close examination of a recent decision of the British Columbia Court of Appeal,'
which annulled, for lack of capacity, a marriage celebrated in the
United States, reveals the influence that the time element may
have on the structure of the rules of conflict of laws . The primary
function of conflict of laws rules is the localization of legal relationships . These rules are concerned with what is usually described as the application of law in space. In many instances, a case
involving a foreign element, 2 cannot be solved satisfactorily unless
the time element is taken into consideration.
In Canada, the subject of conflict of laws in time has not yet
received the conscious attention of the courts or writers. In some
cases, however, the courts have indirectly considered the problems
involved, in order to protect vested rights . 3 Decisions in other
common-law jurisdictions are scarce and chronologically far apart. ,
Only recently have some common-law authors ventured into the
field.' In contrast, on the continent of Europe, the literature on
the subject is rather prolific.' The paucity of Commonwealth
3 Ambrose v . Ambrose (1959), 30 W.W .R . 49, (1960), 21 D .L .R . (2d)
722, aff'd . (1960), 32 W.W .R . 433 (C .A.) .
2 Which brings it within the ambit of the conflict of laws.
3 See Castel, Cases, Notes and Materials on the Conflict of Laws
(1961), p . 157 et seq. ; cf. Re Skinner, [1929] 4 D .L .R . 427, 64 O.L .R. 245 .
In non-conflictual cases, vested rights have been protected. See Re Gage
(1961), 28 D .L.R . (2d) 469, [1961] O .R. 540 (C .A .) ; cf. Re Stuart (1957),
10 D .L .R . (2d) 634 (B .C .) .
4 See, for instance, Lynch v. Provisional Government of Paraguay
(1871), L .R. 2 P . &D . 268 ; Re Aganoor's Trusts (1895), 64 L .J ., Ch . 521 ;
Phillips v. Eyre (1869), L.R . 4 Q .B . 225, (1870), L.R . 6 Q .B . 1 ; Starkowski
v. A .-G ., [1954] A .C . 155 ; Adams and others v . National Bank of Greece
and Athens S.A ., [1960] 3 W .L .R . 8, [1960] 2 All E.R . 421 ; In re Chesterman's Trusts, [1923] 2 Ch . 466, at p. 478, per Lord Sterndale.
s Mann, The Time Element in the Conflict of Laws (1954), 31 Br .
Y .I .L . 217 ; Grodecki, Conflicts of Laws in Time (1959), 35 Br . Y .I .L . 58 .
6 See particularly Roubier, Les conflits de lois dans le temps (2 vols .,
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material is surprising, in view of the legislative activity that has
taken place in common-law jurisdictions in the past fifty years.
One possible explanation for this state of affairs lies in the fact that
awareness of conflicts of laws in space has developed only recently.
It is easy to prophesy that cases involving conflicts of laws in time
and space will become more and more frequent in Canada.?
Time becomes an important factor in the solution of a conflictof-laws problem, where a change occurs either in the content of a
rule of conflict of laws of the forum or in the content of the substantive law of the foreign legal system selected under the appropriate conflicts rule of the forum. In the latter case, the applicable
foreign law has been modified before the litigation, but after the
creation of the legal situation involved. The change may also
involve retroactivity. Both situations require successive laws applicable within one legal system .
The courts must find rules to determine the respective scope
of operation in time, of the successive rules of conflict of laws in
space or the successive substantive foreign laws. .For instance, in
1950, the lex for! has a conflict rule to the effect that "capacity to
marry is governed by the lex domicilia" . In 1959 the legislature
adopts a new law which applies the lex celebrationis. If this law
does not contain transitional provisions, how will the courts, in
1961, test the capacity of spouses, whose marriage was celebrated
in 1952? Will they give retrospective effect to the 1959 legislation? s
1929-1934) ; Roubier, Les conflits dans le temps en droit international
privé (1931), 26 Revue de droit international privé 38 ; Gavalda, Les
conflits dans le temps en droit international privé (1955) ; Level, Essai sur
les conflits de lois dans le temps (1959).
Some leading textbooks on the continent deal with conflict of laws in
time. See, for instance, Batiffol, Traité élémentaire de droit international
privé (3rd. ed., 1959), p. 369 et seq . In the Anglo-American world, Webb
and Brown, in A Casebook on the Conflict of Laws (1960), are the first
authors to refer to such conflicts, see p . 54 et seq .
See also the following monographs : Fahmy, Les conflits mobiles
(Paris, 1951); Marin, Essai sur l'application dans le temps des règles de
conflit dans l'espace (Paris, 1928), and Szaszy, Les conflits de lois dans le
temps (1934), 47 Recueil des Cours de la Haye, p . 166 et seq . ; Kahn, Das
zeitliche Anwendungsgebit der ortlichen Kollisionsnormen in Abhandlungen zum internationalen Privatrécht (1928), Vol. 1, p. 362 ; Poetzold,
La jurisprudence allemande en matière de conflits de lois dans le temps
(1927), 22 Revue de droit international privé 566 ; Goldschmidt, Apostillas
al Derecho transitorio, [1944] Revista de Derecho Immobiliario 705 and
[1945] 42 ; Anzilotti, La questione della rettroattivita della regole di diritto
internationale privato, [1907] Revista di diritto internazionale 120 ; Diena,
De la rétroactivité des dispositions législatives de droit international privé
(1900), 27 Journal du droit international 928 ; Olivi, De la rétroactivité
des règles juridiques en droit international, [1892] Revue de droit international et de législation comparée 553 .
' Because of the novelty of the subject in the common-law world,
there is, at present, a lack of accepted terminology .
11 In Canada, the Bretton Woods Agreements Act, passed in 1945
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Many theories have been advanced to solve problems of conflict
of laws in time. They range from the arbitrary application of the
new law to the case, irrespective of the element of time, to the
more logical theory that the domestic (non-conflictual) transitional
rules of the country which passed the new law applicable should
(c.

11), now R .S .C ., 1952, c . 19, does not contain any transitional provisions .
The courts must decide whether the new conflict rule according to which
certain exchange contracts are unenforceable in Canada, if they are
contrary to the exchange control regulations of a member state (Art . VIII,
s. 2 (b) ), applies to contracts already in existence in 1945. All the Act
says is that (s . 3) : "On and after the date on which Canada becomes a
member of the International Monetary Fund, the first sentence of paragraph (b) of section 2 of Article VIII . . . shall have the force of law in
Canada ." A logical construction of this section is that it applies only to
contracts made after that date.
In Ontario, the Legitimation Act (R.S .O ., 1960, c. 210) contains transitional provisions . The Act states, s . 1 : "If the parents of any child
heretofore or hereafter born out of lawful wedlock intermarried or hereafter intermarry, the child shall for all purposes be deemed to be and to
have been legitimate from the time of birth" (Italics added) . Howevervested
rights are protected. S . 4 : "Nothing in this Act affects any right, title or
interest in or to property if such right, title or interest has been vested in
any person . a) before . . . ." Cf. s. 1, of the Ontario Act to s . 8, of the
British Legitimacy Act of 1926 (16 & 17 Geo . V., c . 60) . Canadian
statutes are not expressly limited to the case of a person whose father
was or is domiciled in the province at any time .
The Ontario Adoption Act, which has been amended several times, has
given rise to difficult problems of interpretation . Today, the Act is part of
the Child Welfare Act, R .S .O ., 1960, c. 53 and contains transitional
provisions in that it states in s . 77 that : "Every person heretofore adopted
under the laws of Ontario and every person adopted under the laws of
any other province or territory of Canada or under the laws of any other
country shall for all purposes in Ontario be governed by this Part." (Italics
added) . S . 76 says in part : "For all purposes the adopted child, upon the
adoption order being made, becomes the child of the adopting parent . . . ."
See also Re Skinner, supra, footnote 3 . As was pointed out in Re Gage,
supra, footnote 3, the question whether, in the absence of specific transitional provisions, retrospective effect should be given to a statute, is a
matter of interpretation . The statute is retrospective if it changes the
legal nature of facts and transactions which took place before it came
into force .
Whenever the courts have held a statute to be retrospective, they
have been careful to protect vested rights. In conflict cases, as well as in
domestic ones, the courts will apply the same principles of statutory
interpretation . In Re Gage, the Ontario Court of Appeal held that the
Ontario adoption legislation, giving adopted children the status of natural
born children, had no retrospective effect so as to extend the meaning
of "child" used in the will of a testator who died before the legislation
was enacted . Referring to ss . 76 and 77 (above) the court said (at p . 474) :
"Those sections make the status of adopted children, whether adopted
prior or subsequent to the passing thereof, that of natural born children
of the adopting parents . The question here, however, is not one of status
but of the intention of the testator. In a case of intestacy certainly the
status of the adopted children is the governing factor . As I earlier stated,
we know without any doubt what the intention of the testator was . The
only debatable question here is : What was the intention of the Legislature
in passing those two sections? Did it intend thereby, in addition to defining
the status of adopted children, to interfere with the disposition of an estate
made by a testator who had died prior to the passing of the legislation?
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govern, that is the general transitional law , of the lex causae .9
Actually, in the case of a change in the conflicts rules of the forum,
this is simply a problem of statutory interpretation not peculiar
to the field of conflict of laws ."

Having stated that question, I answer it at once by saying that in my
respectful opinion the legislature did'not so intend.
"In expressing my reasons for the foregoing conclusion, I can commence as Duff J . (as he then was) commenced his judgment in Upper
Canada College v . Smith (1920), 57 D .L .R. 648, 61 S .C .R. 413, by quotign
the language of Willes J ., in delivering the judgment in Phillips v . Eyre
(1870), L.R . 6 Q.B . 1, as follows (pp . 649-50 D .L .R ., p . 416 S .C.R .) :
`Retrospective laws are, no doubt, prima facie a questionable policy,
and contrary to the general principle that legislation by which the
conduct of mankind is to be regulated ought, when introduced for
the first time to deal with future acts, and ought not to change the
character of past transactions carried on upon the faith of the then
existing law . . . . Accordingly, the Court will not ascribe retrospective
force to new laws affecting rights, unless by express words or necessary
implication it appears that such was the intention of the Legislature .'
"Later in his reasons in that case Mr. Justice Duff quoted and adopted
excerpts -from the language of Parke B ., in Moon v . Durden (1848), 2
Exch . 22, 154 E .R . 389 as follows : That principle is `deeply founded in
good sense and strict justice' ; to deprive people of rights acquired by
transactions perfectly valid and regular according to the law of the time
would be `a flagrant violation of natural justice' . I adopt and apply what
Riddell J .A ., said in McKittrick v . Byers, [1926] 1 D .L .R . 342, at p . 345,
58 O .L .R. 158, at p . 162, -that principle `has been so thoroughly discussed
in the Supreme Court of Canada in Upper Canada College v . Smith, and
the cases have been there so fully canvassed, that no good end can be
met by a reconsideration of it' .
"If the 1958 Act is to be construed as entitling the adopted children of
Mrs . McCormick to share in this estate, then it means that the Legislature
has taken from the grandchildren by blood relationship of the testator
property rights which he gave exclusively to them and given them to
other persons who now, by virtue of the statute, stand in the relationship
of grandchildren to the testator but whom he didn't even think of and
assuredly had no intention of benefiting .
"In my respectful opinion, plainer and more explicit language than is
contained in the legislation here in question is necessary to impel the
Court to reach the conclusion that the Legislature intended that result .
That result would be tantamount to confiscation by the state and distribution by the state, of the property confiscated, to a class . It is a basic
principle of interpretation that the Court always leans against any interpretation of a statute as authorizing confiscation : Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, 9th ed ., pp . 289-90. 1 think it makes no difference
that the property confiscated is not retained by the state but is given, after
confiscation, to other persons ."
In Re Stuart (supra, footnote 3), Whittaker J. held that the 1956
British Columbia Adoption Act, S .B .C ., 1956, c . 2, was intended by the
legislature to be retrospective .
s Batiffol, op . cit., supra, footnote 6, p . 371 .
Io The
lex fori applies . See, for instance, Re Gage, supra, footnote 3 ;
Re Grady (1927), 32 O.W.N. 370, per Fisher J ., at p . 371 . See also Halsbury,
The Laws of England (1st ed ., 1913), Vol . 27, s . 305, p . 159 : "A statute is
prima facie prospective, and does not interfere with existing rights, unless
it contains clear words to that effect or unless, having regard to its object,
it necessarily does so ." and s . 319, p . 167 : " . . . no statute operates to repeal
or modify the existing law, whether common or statutory, or to take away
rights which existed before the statute was passed, unless the intention is
clearly expressed or necessarily implied." and Re Doucette v. Cote and
Oswell (1961), 36 W.W .R . (Sask .) and Metro Toronto v. Reinsilber, [1961]
O .R . 330 .
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Time is also a significant factor when there is an alteration in
the circumstances of localization of the connecting factor . This
has been called a "conflit mobile" by European scholars ." Under
a rule of conflict of laws of the forum, the substantive laws of two
foreign countries, or a foreign country and the forum, are successively applicable.12 For instance, a movable originally situate
in the Province of Quebec is brought to Ontario. The Ontario
conflicts rule, that the lex situs applies, has not changed, only the
situs has, with the result that the law of Quebec applied until the
movable found its way into Ontario. The connecting factor is
still the same but its localization is different. Traditionally included
in conflicts in time, "conflits mobiles" have been excluded from
this category by many authors, who pointed out that the change
in the localization of the connecting factor from one jurisdiction
to another gives rise to a new problem of conflict of laws in space. 13
Although in the case of a "conflit mobile" one must determine
In Dixie v. Royal Columbian Hospital, [1941] 1 W.W .R. 389, 56 B.C.R .
74, Sloan, J .A . said :
"The law relating to the construction of statutes as prospective or
retrospective in their application has been the subject of many weighty
opinions ; some of them irreconcilable . However, from my reading of
the English and Canadian cases, including Smith v . Upper Canada
College, [1921] 1 W.W .R . 1154,61 S.C.R . 413, and McGrath v . Striven
and McLeod [1921] 1 W .W.R . 1075, 35 C .C .C . 93 (and others founded
thereupon) in my view, the following relevant principles emerge as
established by the weight of authority : Unless the language used plainly
manifests in express terms or by clear implication a contrary intention,
(a) A statute divesting vested rights is to be construed as prospective ;
(b) A statute, merely procedural is to be construed as retrospective ;
(c) A statute which while procedural in its character, affects vested
rights adversely is to be construed as prospective ."
In the Province of Quebec see Mignault, Le droit civil canadien,
Vol . 1 (1895), p. 66 et seq . especially at pp . 68-69, who is of the opinion
that : " . . . les droits acquis au moment de la promulgation de la loi nouvelle sont respectés, les simples expectatives sont détruites ou modifiées
par elle ." See also ss . 41 and 50 of the Interpretation Act, R .S .Q ., 1941,
c . 1 . Cf. art . 2 of the Code Napoleon : "La loi ne dispose que pour l'avenir ;
elle n'a point d'effet r6troactif" . The Commissioners appointed to codify
the laws of Lower Canada in civil matters said in their Second Report
(1865), p . 145 :
This article . . . has been omitted, not because the rule it establishes
is incorrect or doubtful, but because its enunciation appears useless and
even dangerous ; useless with regard to the legislature, which would always
have the right not to conform to it ; dangerous with regard to the judge,
who might look upon it as referring to the past and influencing the numerous laws of that nature, to which, under that impression, he might refuse,
although erroneously, to give effect .
"According to the discussions which have taken place in France on
this article, it will be seen that it was only admitted because there was
no fear of the same inconvenience as to anterior laws ."
" See Bartin, Principes de droit international priv6 (3 vols ., 1930-1935),
Vol . I, p . 193 .
18 Conflict of laws in space and time are often combined .
13 Grodecki, op . tit ., supra, footnote 5, at p . 58 .
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"l'empire respectif, dans le temps de deux lois-lois étrangères
ou loi française et loi étrangère-successivement applicables, en
vertu d'une règle de conflit du for, inchangée"," yet "the factor of
space overshadows that of time"." This is confirmed by Roubier,
the leading scholar in the field, who is of the opinion that : "Ces
conflits sont des conflits de lois relevant exclusivement du droit
international privé. Il y a bien une question de temps envisagée,
mais le conflit est un conflit de lois dans l'espace, car il s'agit de
savoir quelle est la limite dans le temps d'une souveraineté territoriale."is
In Canada, the attitude of the courts has been that any rights
acquired under the foreign law, which was applicable until the
change in the localization of the connecting factor, should be protected by the lex fori.l'
In a situation involving a true conflict of laws in time, the successive laws are enacted by the same legislature, the last one repealing the preceding one. In a "conflit mobile", the laws successively applicable are enacted by two different legislatures and
remain in .force simultaneously . In both cases, however, two laws
are applicable successively and the courts must determine to what
extent the question under litigation is governed by the new law.
In some cases, it is also possible to be confronted with a
factual situation containing both a true conflict of laws in time and
a "conflit mobile". In order to avoid the difficult problems that
then arise, the courts might be tempted to exclude the factor of
time and solve the case as if it involved only an ordinary conflict
of laws in space. This temptation seems to have moved the Court
of Appeal for British Columbia in Ambrose v. Ambrose," where the
two types of conflict are present.
An examination of the facts of the case, in chronological order,
is necessary to understand the reasoning of the Supreme Court
Gavalda, op . cit ., supra, footnote 6, p . 35 .
Grodecki, op . cit ., supra, footnote 5, at p . 58 .
Op . cit ., supra, footnote 6 .
t' In the field of divorce, see, for instance, Gauvin v . Rancourt, [1953]
R .L. 517 (Que. C .A.) . See also Johnson, The Conflict of Laws Vol . I (1933),
p . 427, footnote 1 .
A distinction must be made between a simple expectation and rights
definitively acquired . For instance, when rights deriving from the status
of a person under the former legal system have not been exercised, the
new law applies : If, on the other hand, they have been validly exercised
under the foreign law, they are beyond the reach of the new law : tempus
regit actum . A woman, having obtained a valid divorce while domiciled
in Ontario, cannot lose her status of a single person by acquiring a new
domicile in Quebec, even though the law of that province does not provide
for divorce .
11 Supra, footnote 1 .
is
is
is
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and the Court of Appeal of British Columbia . In 1930, the respondent wife obtained an interlocutory judgment for divorce in
California, the matrimonial domicile at the time . This judgment
did not dissolve the marriage, but permitted either party to obtain
a final judgment of divorce after the expiry of one year . On September 14th, 1935, while still domiciled in California, the respondent
went through a marriage ceremony with the petitioner in the State
of Washington . Following the ceremony, the parties lived in
British Columbia, the petitioner's domicile at all times. On September 15th, 1935, that is one day after the Washington ceremony,
the California Civil Code was amended to provide, in section 133 : "
Whenever either of the parties in a divorce action is, under the law,
entitled to a final judgment, but by mistake, negligence or inadvertence
the same has not been signed, filed and entered, if no appeal has
been taken from the interlocutory judgment or motion for a new
trial, the court, on the motion of either party thereto or upon its own
motion, may cause a final judgment to be signed, dated, filed and
entered therein granting the divorce as of the date when the same
could have been given or made by the court if applied for . Upon the
filing of such final judgment, the parties to such action shall be deemed
to have been restored to the status of single persons as of the date
affixed to such judgment, and any marriage of either of such parties
subsequent to one year after the granting of the interlocutory judgment
as shown by the minutes of the court, and after the final judgment
could have been entered under the law if applied for, shall be valid
for all purposes as of the date affixed to such final judgment, upon
the filing thereof.

In 1939 the California court, on its own motion, entered afinal judgment of divorce as of the date of entry. The respondent
then became capable of acquiring a domicile in British Columbia,
which, in the opinion of the Court of Appeal, she did at that time.
In 1941 the following provision was added to section 133 of
the California Civil Code : 11
The court may cause such final judgment to be signed, dated, filed
and entered nune pro tunc as aforesaid, even though a final judgment
may have been previously entered, where by mistake, negligence or
inadvertence the same has not been signed, filed or entered as soon
as it could have been entered under the law if applied for.

The petitioner and respondent separated in 1956. Two years
later, having heard that some doubt existed about the validity
of the Washington marriage, the respondent obtained a court
order in California, which declared that the 1939 final judgment
California Leg . H ., 1935, c. 407.
California Leg . H ., 1941, c. 995 . The section was also amended in
1951, c . 229 .
is
zu
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of divorce be dated, signed, filed and entered nunc pro tunc to be
of record as of 1931 .
The issue, in the opinion of the Court of Appeal, was :
" . . . whether the subsequent legislation of the State of California
should be recognized as having retroactively altered the respon
dent's status so as to have conferred upon her the capacity to
marry the petitioner on September 14th, 1935, and thus to have
divested the petitioner domiciled in British Columbia of his right
to claim that his alleged marriage of September 14th, 1935, was
invalid by reason of the want of capacity of the respondent as
of that date?""
Could the marriage, which obviously was null and void at the
time of its celebration, be validated by legislation passed ex post
facto and not relating to the marriage, when the respondent was
no longer subject to the laws of California relating to her status? 22
To put it more succintly, the real issue was whether the respondent
was capable of contracting the Washington marriage .23 The solu21 Per Sheppard 7.A., supra, footnote 1, at p. 445. Note that in the court
below, it was said that both parties were domiciled in British Columbia on
September 14th, 1935 . Per McInnes J. : ". . . in the present case, both
parties were admittedly domiciled in the province of British Columbia
at the date of the alleged marriage . . .", at p. 56 (W.W.R.). This finding
is clearly erroneous but influenced the decision of that court. If one compares the two decisions, one will find several discrepancies in the findings
of fact including material dates. McInnes J's opinion led me to write, op.
cit., supra, footnote 3, p. 399, that : "It seems to me that if the second
marriage is invalid on the ground that the divorce is not effective, then
the wife is still domiciled in California and consequently the California
legislation, by giving retroactive effect to the divorce, validates her second
marriage . We have here a good illustration of circular reasoning. The
only way out is to adopt the view that by the law of California, although
a married woman, she was entitled to acquire a domicile of choice in
British Columbia . Once subject to the law of that province, she could
no longer be affected by California law." The problem was clarified on
Appeal since Sheppard J.A. held that she acquired a domicile ofchoice in
British Columbia in 1939, after securing her final decree of divorce (at
p. 446)
"However, by reason of that judgment having dissolved the respondent's previous marriage to Harnish, she thereby became capable of
acquiring a domicile in British Columbia where she has lived since
her alleged marriage to the petitioner."
But see (at p. 447)
"From the time of their alleged marriage in 1935, and therefore prior
to the enactment of that statute and to the obtaining of the order of
June 17, 1958, the petitioner and respondent have resided in the
Province of British Columbia and there the parties were domiciled
at all relevant times ; hence the question is whether that statute o£
the State of California and the order pursuant thereto are to be recognized as applying to the petitioner and respondent then domiciled in
British Columbia so as to have validated their earlier marriage in the
State
of Washington."
22 The petitioner was never subject to the laws of California .
23 N o jurisdictional problem arose in this case, as the Court of Appeal
stated that it had jurisdiction to entertain the action either on the ground
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tion of the case seems to turn upon the interpretation of the
British Columbia conflict-of-laws rule that capacity to marry is
determined by the law of the domicile of each party at the time of
the marriage ceremony ."
Was the wife capable of contracting marriage on September
14th, 1935? There are two possible solutions. If one considers the
problem involved as one in the nature of a "conflit mobile" relating
to status, the question is whether the change of domicile between
the time of the alleged marriage and the enactment of the retrospective legislation is to be taken into account. If it is, her status
can no longer be affected by events occurring in California after
1939, the date at which she acquired a domicileinBritish Columbia .
There has been a change in the localization of the connecting
factor from California to British Columbia . Her status after that
date is governed by the law of British Columbia . The alleged
marriage was void ab initio for lack of capacity .
As a problem exclusively of capacity to marry, the Washington
marriage is valid, if the time element is taken into consideration
and effect is given to the retrospective legislation of the domicile
at the time of the alleged marriage . This is a true conflict of laws
in time . The subsequent change of domicile is irrelevant. The
respondent was capable because of the retrospective legislation of
the domicile at the time of the alleged marriage and the order
made under it. It is submitted that there is considerable weight in
this argument. The British Columbia conflicts rule states that her
capacity is governed by the law of the domicile she had at the
time of her alleged marriage ; it does not indicate that capacity is
governed by the law of California as it existed on that date .
that
the parties were domiciled in the forum or on the basis of the domicile
of the petitioner alone in the forum . In the court below McInnes J. said
(at p. 55 (W .W .R.) ) :
"In approaching this question, in my view, I think it important to stress
that the question which must be determined is one concerning the
status of the parties to the marriage, and the effective date in relation
to which this question must be resolved is the date of the alleged marriage, namely, September 14, 1935 . Secondly, it is important to remember that it is the validity of the marriage between the parties
hereto that is paramount, not the validity of the divorce obtained by
the respondent except of course, in so far as it can be shown to affect
the validity of the marriage . . . . . .
This approach is deceiving. Actually, the sole question was her capacity
to marry. If one says that this is a matter of status, the problem is still
the same : What was her status at the time of the marriage? The answer
depends upon the law of her domicil at that time, e .g ., California law .
24 Other
subsidiary conflict rules are also involved, namely, that a
divorce pronounced (or recognized) by the courts of the husband's
domicile at the time of the commencement of the suit will be recognized
in British Columbia and that the status of a person can be altered only
by the law of his or her domicile at the time of such alteration .
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The Court of Appeal considered that the change of domicile
was the most significant factor, since it characterized the problem
as one of status . The retrospective 1941 legislation could not
govern her status, which had become subject to the law of
British Columbia after 1939 . The conflict of laws in time was
thus brushed aside. As I have pointed out, the change in the localization of the connecting factor gave rise to a new problem of
conflict of laws in space, which was easily solved by applying the
new lex domicilii. After 1939, the courts of California could no
longer validly affect the status of the respondent by making the
divorce decree of 1939 retrospective . As a consequence, she had
no capacity to marry in 1935 . The simplicity of this reasoning
may explain why it attracted the majority of the Court of Appeal .
It is submitted, however, that this approach is not absolutely
convincing."
Even if we consider the divorce in relation to her status only,
we find that her status was validly changed by the 1939 decree,
while she was still domiciled in California. The 1941 legislation
and the 1958 order did not purport to alter that status after 1939,
the date at which she became domiciled in British Columbia, but
before, when she was still subject to California law. The 1941 and
1958 events refer only to a valid divorce in the eyes of British
Columbia law. As O'Halloran J.A. points out: 26 "The importance
of the final decree as an essential element in the validity of a divorce
became less and less a matter of substance and more and more a
technical and procedural requirement." Therefore she was capable
in 1931 . Her status was not affected by the California legislation
after 1939 .2' If, on the other hand, one believes that the question
before the court was neither the validity of the California divorce
nor the effect of a change of domicile on her status, but solely the
interpretation of the British Columbia conflicts rule relating to
25 Actually, the reasoning of the court is not always clear ; at times the
court seems to consider that the problem is one of conflict of laws in
time and at others a "conflit mobile" .
26 It could be argued
that since the divorce with retrospective effect is
valid by the California husband's domicile at the commencement of the
suit, it must be recognized in British Columbia . To obviate this argument,
the judge in the court below considered the problem to be one of status .
See supra, footnote 23 .
2' The
1935 legislation was passed while she was still domiciled in
California. The court thought that the petitioner had a vested right in
the annulment . Could it not also be said that the wife had a right to
have her marriage maintained (see discussion infra)? The court maintained that the California legislation and order, if recognized in British Columbia, would divest the right of the petitioner to annul the marriage, when
he never was subject to the legislative or jurisdictional jurisdiction of
the State of California .
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her capacity to marry, all the Court of Appeal had to do was to
interpret the law of California. If that law recognizes the nuncpro
tunc decree, she was capable of marrying the petitioner. This
solution, as mentioned previously, considers the problem as one
of conflict of laws in time. 2$
The facts of the case disclose that a change took place in the
substantive law of California to which the British Columbia law
referred as governing her capacity to marry on September 14th,
1935. The substantive law of the lex domicilii at the time of marriage
was changed at a later date with retrospective effect . That the
British Columbia conflicts rule refers to the country in which a
person is domiciled at a given moment does not mean that it
refers to that country's law as it existed at the same moment. The
reference is to domicile at the time of marriage, not to the law as
it stood at that time. In fact, the British Columbia conflict-of-laws
rule says nothing about whether or not it adopts the foreign law
as it stands at the time of marriage. It refers to the law of California
and leaves it to that law to decide how it stood at any relevant
time. The specific reference to time in the British Columbia conflict
of laws rule, domicile at the time of the marriage, "serves solely
the purpose of ascertaining the appropriate foreign law through
the medium of a connecting factor . Once this is done, its function
is ended and the court is left to determine the conflicting claims
of the parties by applying the chosen foreign law as it is when the
question arises for decision" ." Capacity to marry is determined
by the country in which the wife was domiciled at the time of
marriage and by those laws of the country that are applicable
according to its own legal system . 30 The country selected makes
its legal system as existing from time to time, including its transitional provisions, available for application. Having been referred
to California law as the lex causae, the British Columbia courts
should have applied California law in its entirety, including any
2s A completely different solution also in favour of the respondent, is
that advanced by O'Halloran J .A ., in his dissenting opinion, to the effect
that the judgment of divorce could not be attacked collaterally by the
petitioner who was not a party to it (relying on Bater v. Bater, [19061
P. 209, 75 L .J.P . 60). He also suggested that the validity of the marriage
should be tested by the law of the State of Washington and, that there
was no contravention of justice offensive to British Columbia notions,
in the California retrospective legislation . He was further impressed by
the fact that the nullity proceedings were not taken until after the 1958
California order had been obtained . For all these reasons, he was of the
opinion that the alleged Washington marriage should have been recognized
in British Columbia .
29 Grodecki, op . cat., supra, footnote 5, at p. 73 .
31 Mann, op . cat., supra, footnote 5, at p. 232.
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restrospective law passed prior to litigation . In other words, the
transitional law of the lex causae should prevail.
In order to reject this argument; the Supreme Court of British
Columbia relied on Lynch v. Paraguay Provisional Government,"
which involved a conflict of laws_ in time. The testator died on
March 1st, 1870, domiciled in Paraguay, leaving personal property
in England. On May 4th, 1870, before a grant of probate was
made, a decree was passed that confiscated his property wherever
situate and had the effect that "by the now existing law of Paraguay
no will [of the testator] . . . is entitled to probate or has any validity
whatsoever in England or elsewhere " .32 The will was nevertheless
admitted to probate in England. Lord Penzance held that the
succession to property must be governed by the law of Paraguay
as it existed at the time of the death. He said : 33

The general proposition that the succession to personal property in
England of a person dying domiciled abroad is governed exclusively
by the law of the actual domicile of the deceased was not denied ;
but it was affirmed by the plaintiff that this proposition had relation
only to the law of the domicile as it existed at the time of the death
of the individual in question, and that no changes made in that law
after the date of the death can by the law of this country be recognized
as affecting the distribution of personal property in England. This
contention appears to me well founded .
. . . But it was ingeniously argued that the decree in question has by
the law of Paraguay a retrospective operation, and that, though the
decree was, in fact, made since the death, it has by the law of Paraguay
become part of that law at the time of the death . In illustration of
this view, it was suggested that if the question were to arise in a court
of Paraguay such court would be bound by the decree, and therefore
bound to declare the provisions of the decree to be effective at and
from the time of the death . This may be so ; but the question is, whether
the English courts are bound in like manner ; or, more properly speaking, the question is, in what sense does the English law adopt the law
of the domicile? Does it adopt the law of the domicile as it stands at
the time of the death, or does it undertake to adopt and give effect to
all retrospective changes that the legislative authority of the foreign
country may make in that law? No authority has been cited for this
latter proposition, and in principle it appears both inconvenient and
unjust. Inconvenient, for letters of administration or probate might
be granted to this country which this Court might afterwards be called
upon, in conformity with the change of law in the foreign country,
to revoke . Unjust, for those entitled to the succession might, before
any change, have acted directly or indirectly upon the existing state
of things and find their interests seriously compromised by the altered
law. As, therefore, I can find no warrant in authority or principle for
31

Supra, footnote 4. See also Re Aganoor's Trusts, supra, footnote 4.
at p. 268 .
33 Ibid., at'p. 271 .

32Ibid.,
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a more extended proposition, I must hold myself limited to the adoption
and application of this proposition, that the law of the place of domicile
as it existed at the time of the death ought to regulate the succession
to the deceased in this case . Under that law the present defendants
have no locus standi to oppose any will the testator may have made,
and no concern with his estate .

Reliance on this passage seems to indicate that the Supreme
Court of British Columbia considered the facts ofthe case as giving
rise to a conflict of laws in time . The judge thought that capacity
to marry was governed by the law of the domicile as it stood at
the time of the marriage and disregarded any subsequent changes.
He did not undertake to adopt and give effect to all retrospective
changes that the legislative authority in California made in that
law. The facts in Ambrose v. Ambrose were, however, quite different
from those facing Lord Penzance . Further, the new California
law was neither penal nor discriminatory ." It did not purport to
divest the respondent of any acquired right .',' Consistently with
the view that the case involved a "conflit mobile" rather than a
conflict of laws in time, the Court of Appeal did not rely on the
Lynch case. Thus, Ambrose v. Ambrose cannot be cited as supporting the proposition that in Canada, or at least in British Columbia,
the courts apply foreign law as it exists at the date defined by the
lex fori and disregard retrospective legislation.
In the Supreme Court, as well as in the Court of Appeal, the
parties also relied on Starkowski v. A.-G.11 In that case, the wife
domiciled in Poland, in May 1945 went through a religious cere
mony of marriage in Austria and omitted the civil ceremony,
which was then required by the German Marriage law of 1938 .
In June 1945, while she and her first husband were still resident in
Austria, a special law was passed providing for the retrospective
validation of such religious marriages upon registration . The
spouses became domiciled in England in 1946, where they separated
the following year. In 1949, without the knowledge of the wife,
the Austrian ceremony was registered . In 1950 she married, in
England, a man with whom she had had a child born in 1949.
The question was whether the English marriage of 1950 was
34 Lord Penzance did not rely on the penal character of the Paraguayan

decree to reach his decision, ibid., at p . 272 .
33 I n Phillips v . Eyre, supra, footnote 4, the defendant's
acts were
illegal by the law of Jamaica "as it stood at the time" of the tort but were
subsequently legalized . The court applied the foreign lex causae fully,
including the retrospective legislation . Reference was made to the transitional rules of the lex causae . The court dealt with the change in the
content of the substantive rule of the foreign system designated under the
conflict rule of the forum.
36 Supra, footnote
5.
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valid and legitimated the child, the petitioner in the case. This,
in turn, depended upon the validity of the Austrian ceremony .
It was argued on behalf of the child that the validity of the marriage
must be tested according to the relevant law at the time of the
ceremony, that foreign retrospective legislation is contrary to
English public policy, and, finally, that to give effect to such
legislation would be to alter the status of a person domiciled in
England. The House of Lords, unanimously affirming a unanimous
Court of Appeal" and Barnard J .,aa held that the Austrian ceremony was valid and that the second marriage, which took place
in England, was bigamous . The petition was dismissed. The
House of Lords did not apply Austrian law as it stood at the time
of the ceremony, but Austrian law including its transitional law.
The argument for the petitioner, that after the wife obtained a
domicile in England her status could no longer be affected by
Austrian law, was rejected . As Grodecki points out : 89
The true principle of the case is well stated by Lord Reid : "Once it
is settled that the formal validity of a marriage is to be determined by
reference to the law of the place of celebration, there is no compelling
reason why the reference should not be to that law as it is when the
question arises for decision ." 40
It is believed that this principle is of general import for all cases
involving a change in the content of the substantive rules of the foreign
law selected by the English choice of law rule and that Starkotivski's
case must be taken to have overruled such authority as has sometimes
been ascribed to Lynch's case in this field.

He also remarks that it is regrettable that some of their Lordships
made a somewhat half-hearted and unconvincing effort to distinguish the Lynch case, on the ground that Lynch would have
been relevant only if the second ceremony had preceded the
registration of the first. He states correctly that there is little
substance in this distinction.' The question was the same in
both cases : What is meant by the foreign law to which the court
was referred? For Lord Penzance it meant the substantive rules
only and for the House of Lords, in this instance,42 it included the

[19521 P . 302, [195212 All E .R . 616 .
[19521 P . 135, [195211 All E .R . 495 .
39 Op . cat
., supra, footnote 5, at p . 73 .
11 Supra,
footnote 4, at p . 172 and Lord Cohen at p. 179 . Grodecki
also cites in Re Pozot's Settlement Trusts, [1952] 1 All E .R . 1107, where
"the Court of Appeal did not apply the foreign lex domicilii `as it stood
at the time' of the marriage to test the capacity of parties to marry but
recognized its subsequent retrospective validation by decree" .
41 Op . cat ., supra,
footnote 5, at p . 73 .
42 In Adams and others
v . National Bank of Greece S.A ., supra, footnote
4 and discussed infra, the House of Lords reaffirmed the views of Lord
Penzance .
37
33
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transitional law as well. In the Ambrose case, both courts relied
heavily upon the distinction in order to avoid the Starkowski
case . They were impressed by the fact that the retrospective legislation was passed after the Washington marriage ceremony and
that the divorce was not validated before it . 4a The courts considered
only September 14th, 1935, as the relevant date. The Court of
Appeal also felt that the Starkowski case dealt with the form of
marriage which is governed by the lex celebrationis, whereas in
Ambrose the lex domicilü alone was relevant . Thus, the Austrian
legislative authority could retain control over the validity of the
marriage . The court said : 11
The Starkowski case, however, is distinguishable. In the Starkowski
case, the defect in the marriage was held to be a matter of form and in
respect of such matters of form the proper law is lex loci celebrationis,
hence the legislative jurisdiction of Austria over the form of marriage
arose from the fact that the marriage had been solemnized within
that jurisdiction and the domicile of the parties at that or later time
was not the determining factor of legislative jurisdiction. In the case
at bar, the statute of California deals with a matter of status and
purports to operate retroactively from the date of the enactment . . . so
as to have conferred upon the respondent by means of the order, the
capacity to marry in 1935 . The proper law as to the marital status
and the capacity of the respondent to marry is the law of domicile,
and while the respondent's marriage to Harnish continued, then no
doubt her domicile was in the state of California : Cook v . Cook and
Atty.-Gen. for AIta. 4b But- after 1939, and therefore in 1958, at the time
when that California statute had been enacted and the order made,
the domicile of the respondent was not in the state of California but
in British Columbia . Secondly, in the Starkowski case neither of the
parties whose marriage was subsequently validated as to form had in
the meantime married another . Three of the law lords reserved the
question of the effect of such a marriage having occurred .

and added :
Also that legislation and order purport to confer retroactively on the
respondent, then resident and domiciled in British Columbia, the
capacity to have married, and in consequence to make valid the alleged
marriage which was initially void and performed, not in California,
but in the state of Washington . In effect, the statute and order purport
to define the marital status of two parties neither of whom was domiciled or subject to the state of California at the time of such statute or
43 In the House of Lords, Lord Tucker distinguished Lynch's case on
the ground that it would have been in point only if the English ceremony
had preceded the registration made in Austria in 1949, and Lord Cohen
thought that the subject matter of Lynch was too remote from the question
before the House, supra, footnote 4, at pp . 175, 180 .
44 Supra, footnote 1, at p . 449 . See also Doe & Breakey v. Breakey
(1845), 2 U .C .R . 349, per Robinson C.J ., at p. 357.
45 [1926] A.C. 444 .
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order. Under the circumstances, the Starkowski case can have no
application to the case at bar .46

Yet, why is it impossible for the California courts to retain control
over a divorce validly granted in that state when the parties were
domiciled there? Actually, the Lynch, the Starkowski and the
Ambrose cases are not basically different. The question is always
the same : Should the court apply the transitional law of the lex
causae? 41 It was applied in Starkowski and not in Lynch. There
is no reason to prevent the application of foreign retrospective
legislation as long as to do so is not contrary to the public policy
of the forum. Legislation which is retrospective is not by that fact
alone contrary to public policy . In the Starkowski case, the sug-

46 Ibid., at p . 450 .
Note that in the court below it was stated (Supra, footnote 1, at p . 55
(W .W .R.) ) :
In the Starkowski case two matters were present which are not present
in the case at bar : (1) Before the woman in question had gone through the
second marriage ceremony, Austria had passed legislation under which
she could validate the first ceremony of marriage performed in Austria ;
(2) The woman in question had taken the necessary steps to validate that
marriage and it was a valid marriage in Austria prior to the time that she
went through the second ceremony of marriage in England. Neither of
those conditions exists in the case at bar . . . . [The learned judge was in
error as to the second proposition. Validation took place without the
woman's knowledge or positive steps . Registration was an administrative
requirement in no way dependent upon the will of the parties . Per Somervell
L.J., supra, footnote 37, at p . 618 (All E.R.) : `No act of the parties was
required for, or could prevent validation' . The marriage was registered
by the officiating priest only after the first husband wrote to inquire,why
there was no record of the ceremony on the register .]
"Had either of the parties to the California marriage, or the court on
its own motion caused the final judgment of divorce to be entered before
Sept . 14, 1935, then on the authority of Starkowski v . A . G., supra, it
appears that this court would be bound to recognize such divorce as
final entitling the respondent to remarry . This not having been done, can
legislation with a nunc pro tunc provision make that valid which was otherwise invalid?"
This argument is not without merit, as a distinction must be made
between a connecting factor which is constant as in Starkowski v . A .- G.,
and Phillips v. Eyre, and one which is variable as in Ambrose v . Ambrose .
Even so, "A specific reference to time in the choice of law rule serves
solely the purpose of ascertaining the appropriate foreign law through
the medium of a connecting factor . Once this is done, its function is ended
and the court is left to determine the conflicting claims of the parties by
applying the chosen foreign law, `as it is when the question arises for
decision' ." Grodecki, op . cit ., supra, footnote 5, at p . 73 . On second thought,
it could be argued that the connecting factor in the case of capacity to
marry is also constant. It refers to a particular moment : domicile at the
time of marriage . This place cannot be changed . Even if the spouses move to
another domicile, the validity of their marriage will still be tested by the
law of their domicile at the time of the ceremony. This eliminates the
"conflit mobile" and the argument that a legal system ought not to govern
such facts or relationships as occur at the time when under the conflict
of laws rules of the forum they are subject to the law of British Columbia .
Therefore, such capacity to marry at the time involves the law at that time
and as it will continue in the future .
17 See Mann, op . cit ., supra, footnote 5, at p . 236 .
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gestion that foreign legislation affecting the status of persons
domiciled in England, as such, is repugnant to English public
policy was rejected by Lord Reid who said : "It is certainly unusual
that foreign legislation should have that effect whether it purports
to be retrospective or not, but I do not think that it can be laid
down as a universal rule that it can never have that effect . . . . " 48
In this respect, O'Halloran J.A ., in his dissenting judgment, was of
the opinion that "there was no contravention of justice offensive
to British Columbia notions or English notions in the California
retroactive legislation or in the California Superior Court retroactive order of June 17, 1958, made thereunder. Quite the contrary" .49 Today, retroactivity of statutes appears as a perfectly
legitimate legislative technique in most countries.

'$ Supra, footnote 4, at p . 170 . See also Somervell L .J ., supra,
footnote 37, at p . 304 . Note also that in both the Starkowski and Ambrose
cases, the question of status arose only indirectly . The main questions
affecting status involved form and capacity .
49 Supra,
footnote 1, at p . 440, and he cites Walker v . Walker, [1950]
1 W .W .R . 849 ; Pemberton v . Hughes, [1899] 1 Ch. 781, at p . 790, per
Lord Lindley, and the British Columbia Divorce and Matrimonial Causes
Act which in s . 43 provides for retrospective validation of marriages celebrated before the expiration of the time limit for appeal of final decrees
for divorce .
In the Starkowski case, supra, footnote 4, the Law Officers were of the
opinion that a retrospective colonial Act would validate only the marriage
of persons domiciled at the relevant time in the colony concerned (Thomas,
(1954), 3 Int . & Comp. L.Q . 353) .
In the court below McInnes J ., ibid., at p . 58 (W .W.R .) said : "Mr.
Burton in his very able argument, has pointed to legislation in our own
province similar to that in California, which has already been quoted,
supra, I refer to the Divorce and Matrimonial Causes Act Amendment
Act, 1941-42, ch . 6 . By this amending statute, sec. 38A was added to the
Divorce and Matrimonial Causes Act, R .S .B .C ., 1936, ch . 76 . . . . Assuming for the moment that the provisions of this statute are relevant in the
circumstances, and further, assuming, that the legislation in California,
with which I am confronted, was similar in its terms to the British Columbia statute upon which Mr . Burton relies, and that it could be held to
apply to persons domiciled in British Columbia, a matter which I am not
called upon to decide, a very significant difference immediately becomes
apparent. In British Columbia, decrees of divorce granted are absolute
in the first instance, subject only to a restraint upon remarriage of either
party for a limited time . There is nothing further for the courts to do to
dissolve the marriage tie, and there is nothing required to be done by
either of the parties except to wait until in the efiiuxion of time any restriction on the right of remarriage is removed .
"Quite the contrary situation exists in respect of the respondent's
divorce proceedings in the State of California . First and foremost, all
she, had obtained at the time she married the petitioner was an interlocutory judgment of divorce . . . .
`So that contrary to the situation which was sought to be remedied in
British Columbia by the amendment to the Divorce and Matrimonial
Causes Act in 1941-42, there was no final judgment of divorce in favour
of the respondent at all by the courts of California, and, further, there
could be no final divorce in California until some active step toward obtaining it was taken by the respondent, her husband, or the court on its
own motion to obtain the same, and thereby free the respondent of the
bonds of matrimony with Harnish and entitle her to remarry ."
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It is also submitted that the petitioner had no vested rights of
which he would have been deprived, if the California order had
been recognized in British Columbia ." The fact that the petitioner
could bring an action for annulment is not a vested right. Actually,
the petitioner had not taken any steps in reliance upon the invalidity of the marriage. It would have been different if, before
the decree of 1958, the British Columbia courts had declared the
Washington marriage null and void. The concept of vested rights
is obscure and,of little value for the purpose of deciding actual
cases," although it must be recognized that the problem of time
in the conflict of laws is dominated by this concept.
In the field of matrimonial relations, there is a definite policy
favouring the validity of marriages. This is evidenced by the
Starkowski case . 52 Furthermore, in that case, the foreign legislation
validated the marriage, whereas in the Lynch case it invalidated a
will, thereby depriving the heirs and legatees of a vested interest in
property. The legislation in question in Starkowski and in Ambrose
sought to rectify an originally defective situation. It was not aimed,
as in Lynch, at invalidating what was originally legal. This distinction might explain why in Adams and others v. National Bank of
Greece S.A . 53 the House of Lords relied on the Lynch case, but
did not deem it necessary even to make a passing reference to
Starkowski, in order to refuse to give effect to a Greek retrospective
decree, purporting to relieve the respondent bank from its obligations as guarantor of the bonds on which the appellants were suing.
In 1927 the National Mortgage Bank of Greece issued sterling
mortgage bonds guaranteed by the National Bank of Greece Ltd.
Cy. The proper law of the bonds was English law. In 1953 the
so Sheppard J .A . (ibid., at p . 450) was of the opinion that : " . . . the
petitioner had the right to treat that marriage as a nullity . The subsequent
legislation and order of the State of California, if here recognized, would
divest that right from the petitioner, notwithstanding that the petition
had not been subject to the legislative jurisdiction of California by reason
of having been resident and domiciled throughout in the province of
British Columbia ."
51 Of course, it is admitted that where the marriage is void ab initio
by the proper law, the court only acknowledges the nullity.
51 Somervell L.J ., supra, footnote 37, at p . 619 (All E .R.) said : "Legislative Acts of the kind in question are passed to remedy what has been
done in good faith, but which turns out not to have achieved the result
which the parties intended. The defect can only be remedied by the Legislature of the place of marriage . We can see no reason why those who were
at the time, or later became, domiciled elsewhere should be impliedly
excepted from its provisions .
. . There are many Acts in our statute
books validating marriages when it has been discovered that there was
some legal flaw which had not been realized so that a number of marriages
celebrated at a particular place or in a particular way are invalid ."
53 Supra, footnote 1 .
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National Bank was compulsorily amalgamated with the Bank of
Athens Ltd. Cy. to form the National Bank of Greece and Athens
S.A., which became the universal successor to all rights and obligations of the amalgamated banks. In 1956 a statute was passed
providing that the new bank was to retain the whole assets of the
old bank, which it took as the universal successor under the 1953
statute and was to remain liable for all the obligations of the old
bank except those to the 1927 bondholders. In other words, this
law purported to discharge the respondent bank from part of
the obligations to which it had originally succeeded by enacting
retrospectively, in effect, that the obligations should be deemed
never to have been incurred. The House of Lords thought that
Greek law cannot create an English right or obligation any more
than it can annul an English right or discharge an English obligation. On the other hand, English courts cannot give effect to a
foreign law purporting to discharge an English obligation to pay
money in England.b4 Viscount Simonds stated : 66
It would be neither convenient nor just that subsequent legislation in
Greece should retrospectively or otherwise alter or discharge obligations governed by English law.

This decision can be explained on the ground that English vested
rights must be protected. There was no need, therefore, to rely
on the Lynch case. In fact, to be consistent with his attitude in the
Starkowski case, Lord Reid was careful to point out that : "There
is no general rule that English law will never give effect to foreign
retroactive legislation."" Lord Tucker was of the opinion that :"
The present case is not covered by the actual decision in Lynch's
case (1871), L.R . 2 P . & D . 268, but, in the absence of express authority,
it would seem to me that the principle there enunciated is the one
which your Lordships should apply to a case such as the present,
where foreign law has destroyed one legal entity and created another
as the universal successor to all the assets and obligations of the
former and subsequently seeks by retrospective legislation to exclude
obligations incurred under contracts governed by English law .

The Lynch case is important only if one looks at the 1956
Greek law as a law relating to succession, which, in the words of
Lord Denning, arises from the fact that :
. . . in 1953, the new amalgamated company succeeded to all the assets
and liabilities of the former companies . It was as if they had died and
it had succeeded them . Afterwards, on July 16th, 1956, the Greek
Ibid., per Lord Reid, at p . 429 (All E .R .).
Ibid., at p . 426 .
:6 Ibid., at p . 430 . See also Lord Radcliffe, at pp . 431-432 .
7 Ibid., at p . 432.

b'
66
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legislature, by law 3504, attempted retrospectively to alter the succession by providing that the new amalgamated company should . b e
exempt from some of the liabilities . But this could have no effect on
the bonds . English law does not recognize foreign legislation that
retrospectively'
alters rights of succession.E8

This approach restricts considerably the value as a precedent
of the Lynch case, as well as the decision of the House of LordOg
In the court below in Ambrose v. Ambrose, the judge was also
impressed by the fact that if effect were given to the California
legislation

The status of the parties to this cause could be determined at the in,
stance of either the respondent husband or the courts of California, .
as, when, and if, any of them decided to act . Until they, or one of
them, did, the status of the petitioner and the respondent would be,
and continue to be, a matter of uncertainty, without -any ~power in
the petitioner to resolve that question of status . . . . While not necessarily determinative of the issues involved in this case, the submission
of Mr. Gould for the petitioner that if it were held that nunc pro tune
legislation in. California could prove effective to govern the validity
of marriages of persons domiciled in the province of British 'Columbia,,
then it is possible to say that the respondent herein could,, at her,
option, at any time after she married the petitioner, either arrange to
make her marriage valid or have it remain a nullity. As,he suggests
she could refrain from obtaining her final judgment, as in fact she did
for a period of four years after her alleged marriage to'the petitioner,
and then if the marriage proved satisfactory, cause the final judgment
to be entered, nunc pro tint as of November 31, 1931. Alternatively,
if the marriage turned out badly, she could, as I say, at her option refrain from so obtaining a final judgment and elect to treat her marriage
to the petitioner as a nullity and bring proceedings accordingly .69
sa Ibid., at p. 433 .
59 Lord Denning recognizes that if the original 1953
law is considered
as a law of status, the amending law must also be regarded as a law of
status, and, therefore, does affect the liability on the bonds. In the end, his
Lordship refuses to apply to the Greek legislation any label of precise,
description coming to the conclusion that English courts are not bound
by the comity of nations to recognize an amalgamation which does not
provide for successio in universum jus, ibid., at p. 435 .
60 Supra, footnote 1, at pp. 59-60 (W.W.R.). This raises some interesting.
problems. In Starkowski v . A.-G ., the fact that the registration was.
a mere administrative act independent of the will of the parties was an
important aspect of the problem . Also, should the fact that, in both.
Starkowski v. A . G. and Ambrose v . Ambrose, the parties . separated have
affected the outcome of the case? Separation could be considered as
a repudiation of the marriage, so that the retrospective legislation should :
no longer operate . Neither the House of Lords nor the, British Columbia .
courts seem to have considered this significant. It could have been.
argued in Ambrose . v. Ambrose that, since the marriage ceased to 'exist
de facto in 1956, the 1958 order could no longer affect it. In other words
to allow the retrospective legislation to operate, the marriage should
continue to exist de facto at the time of the validation. See Mann, op. tit .,
supra, footnote 5, at p. 244 .. Finally, it must be kept in mind that the claim:
of the California legislation to govern indirectly the status of the parties,
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It is submitted that if a change occurs in the domestic law of
the country to which the lex fori refers, the courts should, in principle, apply any transitional or retrospective provision of that fo
reign law, unless the circumstances are such that to do so would
lead to inconvenience and wrong," or where the foreign legislation
is against the public policy of the forum. In this way it is possible
to reconcile on a broad basis Starkowski with Adams.
In Ambrose v. Ambrose, the question involved was not a
"conflit mobile" but a change in the domestic law of California
to which the British Columbia courts were referred by their con
flicts rule on capacity to marry. They should have included in
their reference to the law of California the rules of statutory interpretation in existence in that State. The law of California in its
entirety should have been applied.
To conclude, it seems that, in refusing to give effect to the
California legislation, the British Columbia courts were unduly
affected by the (seemingly non-existent) vested rights of the petitioner, who had never been subject to the law of California . In addition, the courts might have feared that had they given effect to
the California legislation they would have infringed the sovereignty
of British Columbia, where the parties were domiciled at the time
of the trial. Perhaps, also, considerations ofjustice and convenience
played an important role in the decision . In the circumstances of
the case, however, a decision in favour of the respondent might
not have changed the petitioner's obligation to support her .62
Although in the past, in the field of conflict of laws in space,
the British Columbia judiciary has always been ready to suggest
new solutions, solutions that were often later adopted elsewhere,
it is to be hoped that Canadian courts will not follow the narrow
path traced by Ambrose v. Ambrose in the area of conflicts of
laws in time and space and that they will show a greater willingness
to apply retrospective legislation within reasonable limits." "Time,
the long, the countless, brings to light all that is unseen ." 64
J.-G. C.

while domiciled in British Columbia, rests on the fact that the divorce
was obtained when the respondent was domiciled in that State .
61
Mann, op . cit ., ibid., at p . 247 . Lynch and Adams, supra, footnote 1,
should be restricted to cases of deprivation of property.
62 I n
Ambrose v . Ambrose (No . 2) (1961), 29 D .L .R. (2d) 766 where the
question was whether the "wife" had a right to maintenance following a
decree of nullity of marriage, pursuant to rule 65 of the Divorce Rules of
1943, now repealed, it was held by Wilson J . that she could proceed with
the action . Brown J., however, dismissed her petition (1961), 30 D .L .R .
(2d) 72, 36 W .W .R . 329 .
sa It would be interesting to know what is now the respondent's status
in the States of California and Washington .
64 Sophocles, Ajax, The Tragedies of Sophocles : in English Prose, The
Oxford Translation (1878), p. 260.

